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JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
The belief that some single formula can in principle be
found whereby all the diverse ends of people can be
harmoniously realized is demonstrably false.'
INTRODUCTION
A liberal theory of contract aims at meeting party expectations.
Throughout this century, many lost faith in such an aim of contract
law. Although many agree that the substantive law of contracts
cannot meet party expectations, it still aims to do so. Fact-oriented
and merely procedural law of contracts may vindicate party
expectations.
A putatively different ideal and aim of contract law, enforcing
only fair agreements, grows increasingly more popular. From the
widespread belief that no rule-oriented or formal theory of contract
law can meet party expectations, some would have contract law
abandon party expectation and inquire only about the fairness of the
bargain. But despite the failure of rules to provide party expecta-
tion, contract law may still pursue the aim of party expectations. A
contract law resting on general principles and standards may
succeed where contract rules failed by rooting particular disputes
in the facts or evidence. Quite interestingly, only the facts of
particular cases can address the notion of a fair bargain. The
criterion of bargain fairness and the criterion of party expectation
hold more symmetry than difference.
The ongoing Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") revision
process has included tentative reform of the problem of the "battle
of the forms" in the law of sales of goods. The contemplated
revision would restore a factual or social practice basis to the issue
of whether a contract for sale has been concluded.2 A will or
ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 169 (1969).
2 The proposed revision to Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") § 2-207
(1993), "Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation," provides:
(a) If the writings and other records of parties to an agreement contain
varying terms, there may be a contract if the requirements of sections
2-204 and 2-206 are satisfied.
(b) Varying terms contained in a writing or record prepared by one
party do not become part of a contract unless the party claiming
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expectations theory is supposed to ignore fairness in the bargain. If
the parties on the evidence have validly agreed to the bargain, then
a will theory, or any liberal theory of contract, is presumed to have
ended the inquiry. Thus, Able may have agreed, but the contract to
which Able assented may yet be an unfair bargain. This reasoning
makes no sense and constitutes the most wretched premise of
conventional contractual theory. A will theory can only conclude
that Able did agree to a contract if the contract is in fact fair to
Able. Only a formal theory of assent creates the possibility of
Able's both agreeing to a bargain and a finding that the bargain is
unfair.3
A social theory of contractual assent cannot present both the
phenomena sufficient to find assent and also an unfair bargain. One
who rejects a social theory of contract may do so, but such a
rejection would seem to imply more than just any theory of
contract and rather contract itself. Suppose that Able and Baker
come from different bargaining communities with customarily
different standards of assent. Able understands that the parties have
crossed the contract-making line, while Baker does not. Neither
party is yet concerned because Able has the deal that she prefers,
but only because Baker has not finished his negotiating. Able wants
the "deal" enforced, but of course Baker does not. A court might
inclusion proves that the party against whom they operate expressly
agreed to them, or knew or had reason to know of the varying terms
from the circumstances and failed to object to them.
(c) If a contract is formed under section (a), the terms are:
(1) those included under subsection (b);
(2) those upon which the writings or records agree;
(3) those to which the parties have otherwise agreed; and
(4) any supplementary terms incorporated under any other
provisions of this Act.
(d) Between merchants, the burden of proof under this section is
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. Otherwise, it is satisfied
by clear and convincing evidence.
' Because the legal realists of the thirties and forties reacted against a formal
rule-based theory of assent, perhaps they appropriately championed the view that
valid contracts could be unfair bargains. These realists invented such terms as the
adhesion contract, which were supposed to exemplify these concurrent
phenomena. Though too little noticed, the movement away from formal assent
in contract law leaves only the realist rhetoric.
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resolve this dispute and enforce an unfair bargain (from Baker's
view) by holding that Able's understanding of the contract-making
line is correct.
But this is a legal decision and not a social decision of assent.
A social decision would require that the parties share the same
understanding of the contract line or that they mutually conclude
that the line had been crossed, even if at different moments.4 When
the shared capacities of the parties diverge materially, no contract
can be formed and the parties or courts must rectify whatever
resulting injustice occurred using principles outside those of
agreements.
To understand how unfair bargains might be contracts requires
an exploration of the history of American contract doctrine. This
Article addresses the defeat of the consensualists and the estop-
pelists of the late nineteenth century at the hands of Holmes, Hand
and Williston and their objective theory of contracts. These
luminaries of contract law built upon the sad dictum of Adam
Smith and the political economy of the nineteenth century, which
centered on the proposition that the value of something could only
be subjective. Thus, whatever she bargained for was the value that
she attached. In principle this might even be true, but in practice,
these same moguls lacked any theory of what a bargain was.
Without a sound theory (and thus practice) of what a bargain was,
the law of contracts settled on Holmes' vague notion of mutual,
reciprocal and conventional inducement.5 But this general phrase
would provide precious little guidance to any particular case; nor
were courts interested in providing the gloss that this, like all vague
ideas, needed for practical application. Sufficient in law was some
act from which a conventional assent might be found. One who
wished to show that one's assent was truly lacking and that there
was no actual reciprocal conventional inducement met disinterest.
No one would doubt that in many problem cases through the
years, the trouble came from the difficulty one had in believing that
" The proposed revision of U.C.C. § 2-207 centers the finding of a contract
for sale within the principle of § 2-204(1), which permits the making of a
contract for the sales of goods "in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract."
5 OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
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someone would consent to such a bargain. If value was so
subjective, we should have great difficulty explaining the easy
consensus surrounding the many cases and examples where the law
meagerly doled out remedies to victims of the most unfair bargains.
Mistake, duress, fraud and undue influence supposedly earmarked
the cases of unfair bargains. Yet, these defensive pleas received
serious consideration only when evidence suggested that the deal in
substance was wrong and that there was unfairness in the bargain.6
The simple tests of assent and consideration provided an
analytical framework so that we should resist nonlegal thinking,
such as: "That bargain stunk from Maine to California." Contract
law became counterintuitive in that the substantively unfair bargain
was first analyzed as valid under the normal rules of assent and
consideration, and then the matter of mistake or duress could be
addressed. A presumption of validity would frequently prove hard
to overcome.
The benefitting party should have the burden of proving real
assent and real, mutual, conventional and reciprocal inducement
where there is apt evidence of an unfair bargain. Instead, and
counterintuitively, the simple rules of assent and consideration
succeeded in ignoring the unfairness of a bargain; by imposing the
burden of proof on the party by virtue of having acted in a
conventional mode of assent, contract law would impose on those
least likely to be able to afford their burden. The contemplated new
evidentiary rules in the revised section 2-207 represent a watershed
6 It is sometimes argued that substantive unfairness in the bargain cannot be
a pervasive test of undue influence, duress or unconscionability because it would
produce the strange result of a duressed, but fair, bargain being enforceable. See,
e.g., MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993).
Identifying fairness of the bargain by a price term alone perverts what is meant
by a fair contract. Being forced to deal with someone at a better price than
otherwise available does not remove the taint of the force. Cf Austin Instrument
Co. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971).
One can, perhaps, only imagine contracts that are substantively fair, but are
produced by invalidating duress just because of the relation of duress to unfair
bargain. Whom one contracts with is a substantive bargain term. Thus, a market
or below market price for a buyer such as Loral Corporation cannot quiet facts
of duress. A duressed, but fair bargain may be a literary figure akin to a devilish
god.
383
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about contractual assent, and offer new protections in both
commercial and noncommercial sales.7 Even if the battle of the
forms in merchant dealings has become a thing of the past,8 and
whatever the final form of revised section 2-207, the overthrow of
old and misplaced values will become complete in this process.
Evidence of agreement will finally displace legal imperative. The
traditional contract law was too conventional about what it would
take to bind someone to a contractual obligation, but contract law
would unconventionally ignore the prime evidentiary basis for
relieving someone (or believing someone's excuse) from a
contractual obligation. Thus, whether a bargain someone sought to
enforce was unfair has only slowly dripped back into the discourse
of contract law. The slow return of this idea came from courts
gradually adopting reasonableness notions to expand the scope of
the idea of contractual obligation. As the U.C.C. abolished much
of the law of contractual invalidity and provided the reasonableness
heuristic for incomplete expressions of agreements, it became silly
and ridiculous to continue to propound the theory of the subjectiv-
ity of value. Widespread and recurrent transactions, mass merchan-
dising and similar developments provided sufficient practical
backgrounds for judicial determinations about what parties intended
when they act within particular social practices. Similarly, this
provided evidence of value too obvious to be ignored. Smith's
dictum had become honored in the breach in commercial law; old
truths await no better veneration.
I. PARTY AUTONOMY IN CONTRACTS
Party autonomy can address all of the important questions
which arise in contract disputes. Yet, in the law of contracts, the
fundamental idea of party autonomy has diminished chiefly because
party autonomy is thought to be unable to deal with these prob-
lems. If party autonomy or party intention were unable to address
See supra note 2 (proposed revision of § 2-207(d)).
8 Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The Commercial Irrelevancy of the
"Battle of the Forms, " 49 BUs. LAW. 1019, 1024 (1994).
384
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the problems of contract law, then paternalism, distributivism, or
another external standard would necessarily have to guide contract
law.
Contract law may use party autonomy to deal with the
particular problems which led to the conventional view that
contract law must transcend party autonomy. The writer's particular
subjects or examples include the topics of assent, duress and
unconscionability, which are widely thought of as intractable or
even meaningless legal ideas if viewed as problems of party
autonomy under a will theory of contracts. 9
The law of contracts is widely thought to have failed in giving
effect to the will of contracting parties in two distinct and inconsis-
tent ways. First, giving effect to the will of the parties is thought
to be the problem of contracts and hardly any solution. Freedom of
contract must, in a popular view, bring down upon the weak the
contractual tyranny of the strong. Second, giving effect to the will
of the parties poses an insuperable legal task of identifying when,
or upon what, the parties had voluntarily agreed. History shows that
contract law has occasionally permitted contractual tyranny and also
failed to understand the intentions of parties. Thus, modern contract
literature offers a law of contracts grounded in substantive
principles outside party autonomy or the will of the parties, such as
social justice or economics. The widespread thought that a contract
law based on party autonomy must err in these ways is, however,
unjustified.
The law of contracts, of course, failed to deal appropriately
with important questions. But this failure occurred because contract
law had already abandoned the guiding value of party autonomy.
9 Hardly anyone seriously considers the alternative of will theory because the
past of will theory jeopardizes the security of contractual agreements by
permitting a promisor to deny solemn promises because of mental reservations.
Whether any truth backs that charge is irrelevant for present purposes. By will
theory, the writer means a law of contracts in which doctrine has the purpose of
giving effect to the parties' intention. An undisclosed contrary intention no
longer upsets an apparent agreement under a will or intention theory any more
than it does under traditional objective theory. Rather, the theoretical basis of
contract enforcement is the will of the parties. Liberal political theory supports
this view of contracts. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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The rejection of the will theory of contracts by the end of the last
century led to an overreaction in contract law against party
autonomy and party expectation. 0 Consequently, an objective
theory of contracts developed which eschewed party autonomy in
the following and central manner: assent to a contract occurred
when a person voluntarily manifested an intent to contract in a
legally conventional way. Even though analytically separate
doctrines, such as duress, fraud and mistake, retained older and
material grounds for the investigation of the voluntariness of
contractual assent, a new theory of contractual assent predominated,
as the idea spread that assent between unpleasant alternatives was
no less voluntary than assent between pleasing alternatives. In this
new regime, older and putatively separate doctrines such as duress
were considered charming relics of an outmoded and failed will
theory.
In addition, the liberal political philosophy which inspired party
autonomy and seriousness about voluntariness and intention fell out
of favor. Critics argued that liberalism failed to explain contract
law, which requires examining the substance of any bargain" in
"0 The writer describes this at length in a work in progress, where he
concludes that the so-called "will theory" of contracts of the nineteenth century
existed primarily in the minds of those who at the turn of the century confronted
a contract law which lacked any instructive idea of agreement. One possibility
was the heavily subjective approach to intention, which logically meant that any
promisor ought to be free to repudiate any promise. There is barely any evidence
of any such theory of contract law in legal sources of the nineteenth century.
Instead, as Professor Gordley has shown, the will theory of contracts marks the
arrival of the continental theory, which puts the intentions of the parties at the
fore of contract law. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPI-ICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONTRACT LAW (1991). Around the turn of the century was a defeat
of a much tamer will theory than modern teachings suppose. The argument
concerns the scope of evidence about contractual assent, which sadly was won
by what we call today the objective theory of contracts. Ironically, in light of the
subsequent rise of estoppel in contract law, the losers in that argument centered
their claims on the idea that contracts by estoppel, those without actual assent,
differ from contracts in which actual assent appeared.
" Liberals doubtfully acceptedthe thesis that contract law may not consider
the substance of a bargain because reasoning from the bargain to decide whether
it is invalid for duress or unconscionability intrudes on party autonomy. On that
thesis, the substantive bargain is out of bounds. However, this outside or external
386
CONTRACT, WILL & SOCIAL PRACTICE 387
order to make determinations on duress and unconscionability'
The need to look at and evaluate the substantive bargain to decide
such cases mandates that liberalism adopt a non-liberal or distribu-
tivist principle.13 So too, liberalism cannot offer a theory of contract
which autonomously guides the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary exchange.' 4 In offering party autonomy, a will" or
metaphor begs the question of freedom of contract, though this metaphor has
traditionally been thought to follow from freedom of contract. Looking at the
contract bargain as outside or external to the parties' agreement assumes the
previous and correct decision upon which the parties had voluntarily agreed.
Duress and unconscionability claimants do not concede that is what happened;
rather, they put agreement in issue. See infra parts V, VI.
12 Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE
L.J. 472 (1980).
"3 "[Clonsiderations of distributive justice not only ought to be taken into
account in designing rules for exchange, but must be taken into account if the
law of contracts is to have even minimum moral acceptability." Id. at 474. The
truth of this thesis is at once obvious and trivial. Contractual imperialists who
would impose rules of exchange on others must do so on the basis of distributive
justice. Those who would desist from designing or imposing rules of exchange,
or liberals, have different obligations. Most notably, liberals have to understand
the social practice of exchange and contract so that the social practice may
flourish.
14 Id at 475-78. Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman holds that the
moral value of voluntarism preferred by liberalism, collapses in the face of
rationality in a choice of the sort exemplified by the robber's, "Your money or
your life." A choice in such a situation, as in others which are bound by
unpleasant alternatives, is rational. Yet, Kronman correctly hypothesizes that
liberals would not want to draw the voluntariness line at such rational choice. He
infers that liberalism cannot draw the line at all. But, to draw the line is a
preoccupation of legal imperialism and perhaps, distributivism. Liberalism
chooses not to draw the same line for everyone; high risk-takers do not deserve
the paternalistic line; nor do low risk-takers deserve the libertarian's line. Legal
imperialism provides an outlook demanding a line qua the line for everyone. See
infra part VIII.
"5 A will theory follows liberalism in using the parties' intentions to resolve
contractual disputes. Will theory is entirely unsatisfactory from the perspective
of contractual imperialism, which would provide a priori backup and baseline
rules of contract law. This presumes that contracting parties cannot speak for
themselves and that contract gaps of intention exist for the law to fill. Lawrence
Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent Theory, 54 MONT. L. REV.
169 (1993). The writer can no more disprove the presuppositions of imperialism
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liberal theory is thus said to fail by needing to turn to non-liberal
principles. Duress, unconscionability or even fraud is perceived as
resting necessarily on paternalistic values far indeed from party
autonomy, which would validate everything but non-cognitive
agreements. 16
Second, party autonomy cannot be a strong value in contract
law when contract law refuses to provide legal protection for what
the parties intended. For example, the problem of a murder contract
or other illegal bargains demonstrates that party autonomy generally
has little to do with contract law.
But a murder contract and a contract entered into under duress
or an unconscionable contract share both similarities and important
differences which are sufficient for guidance by party autonomy. A
general ground: The distinctions some regard as necessarily resting
beyond party autonomy, for example in social justice or economics,
come from the relevant social practice. Only in social practice
might there be any distinction. As to this tenet, it is also worth
recalling that only a liberal view may accept different lines of
voluntariness and involuntariness in different areas of contractual
activity.
Once contract law departed from the guidance of social practice
it could no longer distinguish duress from contractual assent,
unconscionable advantage-taking from contractual assent and
criminal conspiracies from contractual behavior. Without the
guidance of social practice, a largely meaningless idea of intent
came to dominate the law of contracts: It is essential, however, that
the acts manifest assent intentionally. That is, there must be a
conscious will to do those acts.'7 The first restatement illustrates the
meaninglessness of this idea of intention: "A offers to sell B his
library at a stated price, forgetting that his favorite Shakespeare,
than imperialists can disprove the presuppositions of a liberal will theory of
contract. Whether there are generally gaps in contracts for the law to fill is not
a factual question to be decided by empirical investigation. In particular contract
disputes, courts may choose between filling gaps in the documentary evidence
of the parties by legal rules or by evidence of the parties' otherwise expressed
intentions. Liberalism favors the latter.
16 TREBILCOCK, supra note 6.
'7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. c.
388
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which he did not intend to sell, is in the library. B accepts the
offer."' 8 B is entitled to have A's favorite Shakespeare.
On the question of whether A intended to sell his library
including his favorite Shakespeare, the answer under the "conscious
will to do the act" definition is unanswerable (what is the act?) and
hence, this restatement idea of intention is meaningless. No one can
know which of the two quite differently resulting factual proposi-
tions is intended by the "conscious will" definition: does A intend
to sell the library including Shakespeare by his acceptance of B's
offer for the library as the drafters opined, or does A merely intend
to sell the library not including his favorite Shakespeare?' 9
A court needs more information than the empty "conscious will
to do the act" to decide such cases. Perhaps the drafters fairly
assumed that restatement readers would understand. An offeree
such as A is not merely doing an act which is describable without
using a host of legal concepts. Those concepts led the drafters to
their conclusion. The key concern was about people such as A
' Id. illus. 2.
'9 Cf id. § 19. "[A]ssent is not a mere appearance .... There must be
conduct and a conscious will to engage in that conduct." Id. "[A] mental
reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the obligation he purports to
undertake." Id. § 17 cmt. c. But, even if A does not purport to undertake any
obligation to sell her Shakespeare, her "conscious will" lacking, the objective
theory may bind A to a contract obligation because a reasonable person could
believe that A's "mere appearance"manifested assent. Objectivists might explain
that where A ostensibly appeared to assent, she purported to assent. That is a
deep contradiction. For, we may not need to rely on mere appearances; we rely
on the mere appearances under the objective theory because we do not know
whether A intended to sell Shakespeare along with her library. Nevertheless, B
must actually believe that A's appearances of assent meant that A did assent to
sell her Shakespeare. Otherwise, protecting B from A's appearance of assent
serves no party interest other than B's advantage-taking. Thus, if B needs to
show her own genuine, subjective appreciation of A's assenting, this way
requires explanation. The second restatement conceded the collapse of objective
assent into a will theory by adding an express caveat about the will-based
mistake issue regarding A's Shakespeare and intent to contract. Id. § 19 illus. 2.
389
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observing the ethical value of "behaving carefully" ' with respect
to others.
Two unmentioned points in the first restatement are stated in
the same illustration, which is also used in the second restate-
ment.2' First, B might know or have reason to know that B would
not mean by his acceptance to sell his favorite Shakespeare along
with his library.22 In either event, A's "temporary forgetfulness"
produces no contract. 23 Second, whether the A-B contract is
voidable for mistake also finds its way into the later restatement
analysis of the illustration.24
Intent in contract law became a conscious will to do an act,
rather than an intent to effect a contractual relationship. Neither act
nor will presented any simple fact which might be investigated, but
rather depended on more complex social understandings 2 about
seemingly simple facts,26 such as signing a document and shaking
20 The rise of negligence in contract law accompanied the ascent of
negligence in tort law. Nor is the modem diminishment of negligence in the
latter irrelevant to what is happening in the former. Just as contract law accepts
negligent attributions of assent much less facilely than it did earlier in the
century, so has negligence in torts fallen from its citadel.




25 Relational contract theorist, Ian MacNeil aptly used the metaphor of
madness to describe our intellectual-legal depiction of contract abstracted from
society:
[S]ociety surely must be the most forgotten fact in the modem study
of contracts, whether in law or in economics. This lapse of memory we
deliberately impose upon ourselves in both disciplines by our heroin-
like addiction to discrete transactions. And I use that simile advisedly,
for surely it is some kind of madness-the image flashes to mind of
the mad scientist of movie or television-to carve out the body of
society its economic heart, yet expect to examine it as an independent
and functioning organ.
LAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 1 (1980).
26 If contractual intention is any kind of fact, it rests, like other interpretive
facts, on an interpretive theory. Contract law can propound a theory of intent on
any basis it wishes. For example, Judge Posner may factor a wealth-maximizing
theory of intention at least for cases in which the parties' actual intent is missing.
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hands or saying "yes." These social understandings might be
expressed in contract law or left for discovery in litigation. By
denying that any intent to effect a contractual relation was
necessary for an actor to engage a contractual relationship, the law
left itself open to express the social understandings. Not surpris-
ingly, the law chose the lawyers' social understandings and thereby
lost the capability to understand the intentions of anyone not
schooled by lawyers. Ironically, the law's idea of intent to contract
fit perfectly with a class of society who did in fact intend to effect
contractual relations: the lawyered class.
Once the law of contracts took it upon itself to distinguish
voluntary from involuntary behavior, the failure of the law to make
these theoretical distinctions led to the now conventional idea that
duress, fraud and unconscionability had to be reconstructed from
outside party autonomy and from outside contractual intention.
"Policing the contract" became the organizing expression which
identified the failure of party autonomy to provide a contractual
regime protecting legitimate expectations.
Yet, it is wrong to appreciate the failure of a particular
legalistic program of contracts as proof of the failure of party
autonomy. Once contract law was removed from social practice
which alone can provide party autonomy, contract doctrine failed.
The divorce of contract law, here in the subject of contractual
assent, from social practice left contract law to create substantive
legal tests of assent. Unless people and organizations share these
legal tests, the assent of contract law cannot give effect to their
intentions. And party autonomy is lost, unless in some other way,
contract law brings social practice into its account.
However, a will or liberal contract theory may no more endorse
a prescriptive contract law telling parties what they have done than
it may participate in traditional contract's incoherent preaching
An autonomy or will theorist prefers a social practice interpretive theory under
which "missing" intent arises from lack of supporting evidence. E.g., Varney v.
Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 233, 11 N.E. 822, 826 (1916) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(stating the concept of indefiniteness in contract law as the lack of evidence of
contractual intent).
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about what, "as a matter of law," parties have in fact done.27
Because liberalism cannot endorse such a contract law, for some it
fails.2 8 Of course, liberalism cannot tell anyone what may and
may not be done. That is the success of liberalism and the
fundamental error in divorcing doctrine from social practice or
propounding doctrine in arrogant ignorance of social practice.
Seemingly paternalistic and protective doctrines such as
unconscionability 29 are said to impeach the liberal value of party
autonomy. In another view, however, putative policing doctrines,
such as unconscionability, follow from liberal values such as party
autonomy. The inspiration for refusing to enforce contracts lies in
rejecting a frequently fraudulent autonomy bred by traditional
contract doctrine. Contract law went mad3" about the meaning of
agreement and the value of autonomy. A century-long infatuation
27 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Problems in Contract Law and
Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1127 (1994).
28 Kronman'stipulates a form of argument that cannot be answered by liberty
theory. By limiting the field in that way, he takes a small victory and surely not
the trophy that he sought. Tripping up a liberal in this way is as mean as denying
a utilitarian his calculus of pain and pleasure. Kronman argues that the liberty
theory must create a theory of rights that are independent of the rights that
people hold by
nature or convention. But, rights cannot be ascertained in this way.
Every claim concerning rights is necessarily embedded in a controver-
sial theory: the only way to justify the claim that a person has a certain
right is to argue that he does, and this means deploying a contestable
theory that cannot itself be proved or disproved by simply looking to
see what is the case. In order to apply the liberty principle, we must
already have a theory of rights. Because it does not itself supply such
a theory, the liberty principle, standing alone, provides no guidance in
deciding which forms of advantage-taking ought to be allowed.
Kronman, supra note 12, at 483-84. Kronman claims that liberal theory may not
use conventions to derive rights. Though it is true that a liberal conception of
duress could not be proved right for everyone under any particular bargaining
convention, it is not true that a liberal conception of duress propounds a
substantive conception of duress. A libertarian or a liberal may propound a
theory of duress which uses conventions or social practices appropriate to
particular disputes.
29 As parts IV-VI, infra, maintain, unconscionability protects the idea of
contractual assent.
30 See supra note 25.
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with an objective theory degenerated autonomy as the concept of
agreement in contract doctrine.
Appreciating the substance and fairness of a bargain jeopardizes
neither liberalism nor contract. Voluntariness may constructively
reinvigorate the core of contract. Unconscionability, duress and
fraud in this view do not stand outside the idea of contract awaiting
the imports of distributivists or economists to justify invalidation
of apparent agreements. Rather than liberalism, a peculiar twentieth
century idea of contractual assent or intent, a mere "conscious will"
to do an act, a meaningless and legalistic idea of assent and intent,
fostered the outsider status of unconscionability and the kindred
doctrine.
II. ADVANTAGE-TAKING AND VOLUNTARINESS
The basic inquiry of duress, unconscionability, or fraud is
whether one party unfairly took advantage of another. Part and
parcel of contract is the fact that each party takes an advantage
from another. Working well, neither party minds losing the
particular advantage to the other as she prefers the advantage that
she will take from the other. Taking advantage is not problematic
in contract; taking unfair advantage is. The doctrinal terms for
unfair advantage include duress and unconscionability.
Normal contractual advantage-taking follows from a liberal
principle of state abstention in voluntary affairs. Voluntariness is
never, or rarely, complete. Second thoughts often permeate the
giving of contractual assent. No wise or experienced person would
ever utterly throw herself into contractual assent. When people do
wholeheartedly assent, one may properly question their wisdom or
experience but, more importantly, their motive for assent.
When assent is unfairly produced, as through physical or
economic duress, the motive for contractual assent is quite different
from cases of normal advantage-taking. Assent in physical duress
(as with economic duress or unconscionability) is, if voluntary, not
identical to assent to a contract. It is assent to a forceful demand.
That forceful demand comprises the unfairness of which one would
speak in describing duress as unfair advantage-taking. A duress
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victim assents to a contract on the demanded terms no more than
a submissive rape victim assents to rape.
Nevertheless, some insist that victims of duress act voluntarily.
They insist that the contractual assent behavior in duress is
voluntary, even more voluntary than usual. For these critics, all
decisions between alternatives, however produced, are voluntary.
Indeed, they argue that choice, even between unpleasant alterna-
tives, is voluntary. Such thinking nicely summarizes the degrada-
tion of contract. This thinking strips particular, expressive behavior
from its social context under the illiberal axiom that only one
normative account may follow from particular behavior. In the
context of contractual assent and duress, for example, the particular
fact that a duress victim signed the contract is the expressive
behavior which led to the legal conclusion of contractual assent;
intention to contract. In this vacuous and vicious theory, there is no
room for a liberal idea of contractual intention. Social practice,
however, has no trouble accurately describing an event of physical
duress as bearing, no real contractual assent; no intention to
contract. Economic duress and unconscionability often present more
difficult questions, but are still better answers when .understood by
social practice. Yet, what might be duress in one social context
may be assent in another.
No theory of particular, expressive behavior can distinguish
material differences in social contexts. If signing a contract alone
is assent, then the context of fraud in the inducement or the
execution of the document, or physical or economic duress cannot
matter. Traditionally, contract law has analytically separated
contractual assent from unconscionability, duress, or fraud as
though these are separate social events. Hardy, if futile, legal
distinctions between acts which may void or merely permit
avoidance followed from the analytical legal separations.3
However, the facts of such problematical "contracts" do not occur
separately, but together. Contract law retained the particular
expressive theory of assent by creating supplementary and appar-
ently independent remedial principles for formally effective, but
materially defective assents.
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(3) (1981).
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Contract law lost a theory of voluntary assent unless one
includes what the doctrine separates, duress and the like. It is not
that assent is as voluntary in duress as in the usual case of contract;
but the voluntariness of assent became immaterial with the adoption
of the objective theory of contracts as particular expressive
behavior in which voluntariness fell to manifested assent. As the
restatement asserts, all that contractual assent requires is a "con-
scious will to do an act."32 And assent as conscious will is held
separate from duress and the like.33
Yet, the law of duress requires material and not formal consent
whenever physical force is suggested as the motive for someone's
formal signing of a contract. Similarly, but differently conceived
concerns about scarce opportunities and goods also require material
consent. Although our law has traditionally protected against unfair
advantages by holders of scarce resources under various other
labels, laws against restraint of trade have a basis in duress vitiating
3 Id. cmt. c.
a Indeed, insight into the inextricability of assent and duress, for example,
culminated in the second restatement's candid holding that a manifested assent
does not need to be real assent. This holding immediately directed attention to
causes, such as duress which may invalidate the contract. Id. This curious result
follows only from perpetuating the particular expressive theory of assent, called
manifested assent. Manifested assent continues, aside from the invalidating
causes, because of the concern that a promisee may be injured by an appearance
of assent in a circumstance in which a promisee has not committed any of the
nominate invalidating causes, such as duress. The reason for the restatement's
continuing solicitude for the promisee is the assumption that she actually
understood the apparent promise as genuine assent and may be injured should the
law permit the apparent promisor to prove that the apparent assent was not real.
Here, contract law requires no proof of actual injury, which would seem to be
so probative on a promisee's actual understanding of a manifested assent,
presumably because it is likely to occur in ways that are often incapable of being
proven.
But whatever social practice supports, understanding a promisee's expression
as assent also resolves the question of the promisor's understanding. When
reasonable persons in such settings might only understand an expression as assent
to a contract, no need arises for distinguishing a promisor's manifested intent
from her actual intent, nor does the law supplant actual non-assent with
manifested assent. Thus, a promisee is not excused from proof of actual injury
caused by a difference between an apparent and a real promise because such
proof may be difficult to muster.
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unduly one-sided contracts. For example, employment-required
covenants not to compete traditionally receive a validation test of
reasonableness in time and in geography. Here, the assent that
employees give to unreasonable terms is frequently understood as
mere formal consent, essentially involuntary and produced by the
greater need of the employee for work than the employer for
protection. Nor does contract law give way, as often believed, to a
grander social policy than freedom of contract; freedom of contract
produces material or real assent only to reasonably protective terms.
The typical employer has no further reasonable expectation.
The would-be employee is treated like the needy resident of a
weather-ravaged land after a hurricane in Miami and after the
recent earthquake in California. In both locations, reports of
gouging surfaced immediately after the disasters struck. Sellers
were offering Miami residents plywood to shelter their homes
shortly before Hurricane Andrew struck, while itinerant outsiders
offered generators along major South Florida roadways soon after
the storm. Prices jumped far into the abnormal. The formal consent
for which contract law is justly infamous abounded. Were there no
difference between formal and material assent on the scale of
voluntariness, the greater need for shelter and power would fortify
arguments that here was even more willing assent than usual or
necessary. Here again, choice between unpleasant alternatives
would still be thought of as voluntary.
As with the description that they share of a contract signed
under the gun of another, some might describe these disaster
victims as even more willing and voluntarily assenting than usual.
This view misconceives the law of contractual assent as the law of
supply and demand.34 Without refinement, this supply and demand
theory suggests that a mugger whose victim submits has obtained
contractual assent. Some gougers defended their conduct. For
example, one gouger, interviewed by a ubiquitous television
reporter, raised the mantle of freedom of contract in Miami after
Hurricane Andrew: "I drove down here from Jacksonville, so I
" Trebilcock points out a survey to the same effect, under which respondents
rejected the fairness of a store raising its prices of a temporarily scarce resource.
TREBILCOCK, supra note 6, at 89.
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guess I deserve something extra."' 3' For too long, traditional
analysis, no doubt effective as analysis and nothing more, has
paraded aspects of voluntariness as sufficient for the concept of
contractual assent. Yet, were one inclined to the pragmatic rather
than the analytic, one should say that contractual assent generally
requires more than mere shadows or aspects of voluntariness,
especially when one claims duress.
Accepting the normativity of formal consent precludes examina-
tion of the meaning of someone's signing a contract document or
another's paying a gouger. The premise of formal consent, if
accepted by a liberal view of contract does indeed preclude any
liberal view of duress, gouging or other forms of unconscionability.
But the probity of the premise of formal consent for a liberal
theory of contracts cannot be established.
Arguments like this take contractual assent as formal only and
purport to tie liberals to an unliberal conception. Different theories
of political organization might concur on the legal and organiza-
tional force to the idea of formal consent. So, too, might they
disagree. Formal consent might suit a distributivist regime because
contractual choices may rarely dictate important wealth distribu-
tions. But a liberal regime cannot accept formal consent for the
opposite reason: material consent and real assent will importantly
determine wealth distributions under liberalism. The numerous
invalidating doctrines of contract law affect the configuration of
material assent. In so doing, unconscionability, duress and fraud,
for example, speak directly from the liberal value of party
autonomy to the issue of contractual intent or assent. Reading the
law of assent as merely "a conscious will to do an act" means that
assent to a mugger is sufficiently voluntary to form a contract, not
a crime. That distorted view misses the animating social practices
by which contract and crime are quite different, though some
aspects of voluntariness appear in both.
Formal ideas of assent have been accompanied by a simplistic
conception of freedom of contract. The employee who has signed
an unreasonably long or spacious covenant not to compete is
'5 Susana Barciela, Andrew's Aftermath, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 29, 1992, at
28A.
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thought on the desideratum of freedom of contract to have a moral
and legal obligation. Thus, we have long used such rhetoric to
excuse the employee from her promise on the ground of an unfair
bargain, when the question (or the answer) may have been whether
the employee had in fact agreed to such a bargain.
III. CONTRACTUAL INTENT: MEANING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE
Just as the behavioral norms under which moral or legal
obligation arises vary from time to time and place to place, norms
may differ in the same time and place between organizations and
individuals. Contract law may affect these norms or use these
norms. When contract law uses these preexisting norms, it opens
the possibility that behavior between A and B may lack legal
effect, though apparently identical behavior between C and D may
have legal effect. The traditional legal expression explaining this
apparent discrepancy is the intention of the parties. A and B may
mean or intend something different than C and D. Under the
principle that what the parties mean or intend by their behavior
controls in contract law, these two cases are decided differently,
though particular expressive behavior is identical.
Additional facts may differentiate these cases, but these
additional facts do not alter the observation that certain behavior of
the parties was identical. Unless one understands the party
intentions or meanings as simple facts, this must be so. But if
intentions are facts, then they are facts that are richer than what A
and B or C and D said to one another. Any observer who is
familiar with the ordinary meaning of the words that the parties
exchanged should report that A and B said pretty much the same
as C and D. The same observer cannot clearly report what the
parties intended by their words. If asked what these parties meant,
a cautious observer will report what these parties meant tentatively,
and perhaps, alternatively.
For example, an observer might not know that A had a gun
under the table and that B knew of the gun. The observer would
therefore likely take B's words, "I accept your offer," as intending
to form a contract for the same reason that the observer would find
a contract between C and D. Yet, contract law holds that duress
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invalidates the contract between A and B because B likely did not
intend to create a contract with A if induced to agree by physical
duress. However, if the observer knows of the gun, under contract
law she might distinguish the cases of A and B from C and D on
this basis. The gun under the table is a new and material fact. Yet,
if this is so clearly a fact, it is not truly different from subtler facts
about the parties' intentions.
Interpreting meaning or intention invites the observer to look
under the table for a gun which might provide the best explanation
as to why B accepted A's offer. Yet, an observer cannot find
anything interesting under the table without some interpretive ideas
about what might be there. The observer of contract-formation
events has to have an idea about what it is that makes a contract to
have identified A and B's behavior as perhaps resulting in a
contract. When that observer is asked what else happened, her ideas
about forming a contract are likely to evoke her to report that A
had a gun in his hand, rather than the metallic object which was
pressing against B's flesh.
The welter of raw facts presents essentially meaningless
information unless the observer does some presorting. Information
may become meaningful only when it attains significance. Two
levels of significance hold in a liberal contract analysis. First,
socially understood behavior is necessary to sort significant facts.
Second, legal significance comes to some of those socially
understood facts. For example, it is quite understandable that B
may regret his contract with A and refuse to perform. If no gun
were involved, and B regretted his contract because he had the flu,
then social practice would have to be consulted to determine the
intent or meaning of whether a case of the flu is understood to
overcome socially acceptable, contractual behavior. Thus, where A
claims that B should be bound despite the gun because B merely
chose between unpleasant alternative opportunities, as contract
actors often do, the choice ("your signature or your life") is less
impressive than the social understanding that such choices may
have a different significance (socially and thus legally) than other
choices.36  The regulative function of contract litigation
36 Contra Note, Economic Duress after the Demise of Free Will Theory: A
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distinguishes between behavior that is socially acceptable and that
which is socially unacceptable.37 Practicing duress or unconscion-
ability typically falls into the latter category; enforcing normal
exchanges falls into the former. In neither case, however, does a
second level of meaning, the law, have to present new normative
understandings of the parties' behavior. It may. But it is an
analytical error to suppose that a normatively qualitative jump
necessarily occurs from the legal translation of socially understood
behavior to the final step of legal interpretation. An autonomy or
will theorist prefers a social practice under which "missing" intent
may arise from lack of supporting evidence.3"
IV WILL-INDEPENDENT NORMS IN CONTRACT
Among the challenges in recent years to the integrity of a
liberal account of contract is the contention that a liberal theory
cannot explain or justify certain traditional features of the law and
institution of contract. Consider, for example, a contract39 that is
clearly unenforceable and illegal in contract law: a contract between
Proposed Analysis, 53 IOWA L. REv. 892, 894 (1968). "The free will concept
... has serious shortcomings. Because both normal contracts and those formed
under duress result from a choice between alternative evils, it is impossible to
distinguish one situation from the other on the basis of any difference in the
freedom of the consent." Id (emphasis added). This note abuses the concept of
freedom of choice by treating it as a simple fact manifested by any event of
choice. Consider whether anyone has the freedom to murder. If by this, one
meant that the odds were long that someone would stop an attempted murderer,
one would use freedom in the simple fact sense of it being likely that one could
succeed in murdering another. However, the test of social practice bars the
freedom to murder others, In demanding, but not finding an empirical test for
measuring whether the amount of freedom an alleged duress victim exercised, the
cited note overlooks social practice.
" Classical contract theory states a transcendentally stronger thesis: that the
regulative function of contract law is to separate from socially understood
behavior that which is socially acceptable from that which is socially unaccept-
able.
" E.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 233, 111 N.E. 822, 826 (1916)
(Cardozo, J., dissenting).
39 Here, contract merely means agreement.
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A and B, by which, in exchange for A's promise or payment of
money, B will murder C. Because murder is illegal, courts reject
As claim for a remedy for B's breach and vice-versa. Yet, the
intentions of A and B, if controlling in contract law, argue that the
legal result of invalidity arises from a norm that is independent of
the will of the parties. The thought is common that contract law
must jump to an independent legal norm, the illegality of bargains,
to deny enforcement of this socially disapproved intention of the
murderous A and B. The intentions of the parties appear to conflict
with the applicable legal norm. The consequence of such thinking
both excuses and supports normatively independent moves for
contract law from the parties' intentions to extrinsic standards.
This position has attracted wide support for the use of contract
law to support social goals that are independent of party goals. No
doubt contract law may accomplish normative goals that are
independent of the parties' goals. That differs, however, from the
idea that contract law must inevitably adopt norms or values
independent of party autonomy. It may be true that contract law
adopts norms or values beyond party autonomy, though that seems
doubtful. But the claim here is merely that contract law does not
need to go beyond party autonomy. Like law generally, contract
law can be meaningfully autonomous of goals and purposes that are
extrinsic to party intention. Unlike law generally, contract law
should be so.
Contract law disapproves of murder contracts. A murder
contract signifies the will of the parties. Ergo, contract law to some
extent rests on a will-independent norm. This syllogism rests on an
erroneous minor premise which converts the intention to murder C,
as the result of a bargain, into the social and thus legal idea of
intention to be legally bound. Only a strange idea of intention to be
legally bound generates this logic. This is the equivalent of saying
that A and B are morally bound to commitments that they know
are morally wrong or that A and B have joined in a socially
acceptable enterprise as contract, which remains socially acceptable
even if an aim of the particular enterprise is socially abhorrent.
Thus, in the traditional view, the autonomy of parties who are
outlaws deserves equal respect under a will theory as it bestows on
normal parties. By rejecting party autonomy for outlaws who make
illegal bargains, a liberal theory of contracts must fail.
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This argument mistakenly identifies socially understandable
behavior with socially acceptable behavior. If contractual obligation
arises from behavior which is socially acceptable, it does not
logically follow that socially understandable behavior that is
somewhat like contract also produces the same obligation or the
same intention that the social practice of contract produces. Indeed,
our intuitions about the sense of commitment, the intention to
contract and the "morality of contract law," as Lon Fuller might
have said,4" support a wide gulf between contractual outlawry and
conventional contract goals. Nevertheless, a narrow intent test
supports identical conclusions about conventional and illegal
exchanges. Yet, that test finds little support in social practice.
Rather, a peculiar and socially abstracted legal test of intention
generates a new, will-independent norm which attracts the criticism
that the will of the parties insufficiently explains contract.
The murder contract hypothetical surely displays an intent4 to
perform the evil bargain. The question is whether that is the same
as the social idea of intention to be bound to a contract. If the
social practice of contract excludes socially understandable but
socially unacceptable contract means (duress) or goals (murder),
then a will-based contract law must exclude contracts to murder.
No one under such a social practice may both have an intention to
be bound to a contract and use socially unacceptable methods or
seek socially unacceptable goals.42 By determining actual inten-
tions, thus, social practice circumscribes the legal test of intent to
contract. Parties can only be understood and be situated within a
social practice, so that social practice cannot be outside the parties.
The murder contract becomes no different than the problem
posed by the appropriate boundaries of other intentional behavior.
For example, the logic of the view that a contract to murder
manifests the same contractual intention that is present in a sale of
land or goods rests on a very simple idea of agreement. The idea
40 See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
41 The intent may be entirely apparent and not real. The hirer may be a
police officer who is engaged in a sting; the murderer-to-be merely a con man
who is ready to run with the money.
42 However, relevant social practice may be indifferent to some methods or
other goals, eccentric or idiosyncratic, which liberalism would then enforce.
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is merely that the parties agreed. But people and institutions agree
in many ways. Most agreements are never thought to be contracts.
Occasionally, sad reports of contract lawsuits surface from broken
social agreements, such as prom dates. Because contract doctrine so
meagerly addresses the subject of which agreements are contracts
and which are not, cases of broken dates are perplexing from a
purely legal perspective. Such cases help us understand how we
may too quickly accede to the suggestion that a murder agreement
is a contract. A contract for the sale of goods, a murder contract
and a date-break are all agreements. Yet, they are not all contracts
any more than any agreement is a contract.
Nevertheless, the emptiness of any legal or doctrinal explana-
tion as to why these are not all contracts permits resolution of both
date-break and murder contract cases on the social practice of party
autonomy. Whether the victim of a date-break should recover
depends on whether the parties actually expected legal protection
from their agreement. In this respect, most cases of date-break will
present casual circumstances which give rise to few, if any, actual
expectations. Yet even here, the special significance of a prom may
differentiate that case from other social engagements. The social
practice surrounding the prom, including the expenses of gowns
and tuxedos, may show a different or higher level of commitment
than social engagements in general. When, as likely in this context,
this social practice is controversial, a jury may best speak to the
social practice.
Legal doctrine does speak fully on the murder hypothetical,
however. But the question raised by the doctrine of illegal bargains
is whether the murder rests on the social practice of party auton-
omy or whether its treatment of a murder conspiracy rests on
another, independent value. If especially significant dates can give
rise to actual expectations of legal protection, if such may fall
within a social practice which makes breach of promise unaccept-
able, the same test is likely to exclude legal protection for a
contract to murder. Party autonomy means more than the act of
agreement as in the context of casual social engagements, and the
same is true for anti-social agreements. By refusing to enforce
heinous agreements, party autonomy may frustrate the will of
heinous parties. Party autonomy does not require enforcement of all
agreements, but only those which fall within the social practice of
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contracting. When contract law broadly strikes down illegal
bargains, it rejects any claim that the parties intended to legally
enforce their bargain as factually incredible. Thus, the party
autonomy of contract law grounds the rejection of legal enforce-
ment of murder contracts and other illegal bargains.
Contract law is not merely about agreements or manifested
intentions that are divorced from social practice. Contract divorced
from social practice might engage in strange, but logical reconstruc-
tion of, for example, tort law, entirely in the language of contrac-
tual intention: when A drives on the street, contract law divorced
from social practice might hold that A manifests an intention to
compensate anyone who is injured from As negligent driving.
Similarly, when a manufacturer puts a product into the stream of
commerce, contract law divorced from social practice might hold
that a manufacturer promises to compensate anyone who is injured
in a reasonably foreseeable way by a defect in the product. Logic
permits this, but experience or social practice rejects that descrip-
tion of intentional behavior such as driving or manufacturing.
Thus, to say of the murder contract, driving, or manufacturing,
that intending to do an act is identical to intending to be contractu-
ally bound, mistakes what may be no more than intentional
behavior with intention to be legally bound to a contract. As with
equating agreements with contracts, social practices repudiate such
an understanding. In duress cases we reject a logical explanation,
choice between unpleasant alternatives, because it similarly misses
a norm in the social practice of contract-making.
Only by divorcing the will of the parties from the context of
our social practices is one led to assume that there may be the same
meaning in any form of intention as there is in the intention to be
legally bound. But removing the parties' conduct from context
always produces nonsense.
V. SOCIAL PRACTICE
To summarize: Two explanations follow from courts' refusing
to enforce murder contracts. Either courts refuse to do so because
parties to such contracts lack the intent to be bound that is
necessary for a valid contract, or because contract law renders such
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contracts invalid regardless of the parties' intentions. The conven-
tional view of contract law holds the latter view. That view
welcomes into contract law nonparty goals, leaving contract law as
an eclectic blend of party autonomy and external standards. At any
moment, the latter may trump the former and produce chaos for
particular expectations by particular people and institutions who are
parties to contracts.
Because party intent seemed to offer no reason why courts
might reject illegal bargains such as murder contracts, contract law
seemed to need nonconsensual norms. But this assumes that the
same intention supports murder contracts and normal employment
contracts, duressed contracts and voluntary promises. The norm of
party autonomy has been thought to support equally each of these
agreements as valid contracts.
Instead, the previous discussion suggests this: Social practices
differentiate between kinds of agreements. Contract law may draw
upon social practice to differentiate by appreciating the difference
between socially unacceptable and socially acceptable behavior.
Broadly, that is the function of all law. The contract to murder
frazzles the party autonomist because it includes some behavior
which is routinely understood to produce a contractual obligation.
The party autonomist's seemingly normal, contract-making behavior
is seduced in the same way that an audience is moved by the
charm, wit, or intelligence of a serial killer, whom they momentar-
ily perceive as normal or attractive.
A director may focus an audience's attention on those favorable
attributes of a serial killer (i.e., charm, wit, or intelligence) which
an audience would like to possess. Similarly, from the point of
view of contract law, one may focus upon certain aspects of a case
or hypothetical and be likewise so mesmerized by the parts as to
miss the whole picture. For example, one who hires another to
murder acts no differently in part than one who hires a gardener.
The structural similarities between the contract-making activities,
as with the structural similarities of the audience's self-view and
the attractive characteristics of the cinematic serial killer, challenge
our abilities to understand party autonomy and ourselves. Both
experiences ask us to understand them better.
The murder contract, for all of its contractually formal
similarities with socially acceptable behavior, falls substantively
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outside the social practice of contract.43 The conventional thesis
is that the mere purpose of the murder contract puts the murder
contract outside the social practice of contract. Thus, contract law
here has to trump party intent and this opens the door for regula-
tion of any contract purpose, including those unsupported by social
practice.
On the other hand, if one found that in fact, and not in form,
people who agree to murder contracts do not have the same kind
of intention to be bound, if any at all, as occurs in socially
acceptable contracts, one should not accede to the conventional
thesis that it is merely the unlawful purpose of such a contract
which produces its invalidity. Yet, the conventional supposition is
that murder contract parties do have the same intent to be bound.
Like the charming serial killer, parties to such socially unacceptable
contracts are too easily thought to be "just like us."
Similarly, people who are forced to sign a contract at the point
of a gun and people who use guns to coerce assent, are too easily
thought to have the same intention to be bound as parties who
assent to contracts through socially acceptable forms of persuasion.
Conventional thinking here assumes what is in doubt, including the
fact that parties to such contracts actually have the same intentions
or expectations as parties to socially acceptable contracts. Yet, if it
were the fact that actual intentions or expectations of parties to
socially unacceptable contracts. differ from those of socially
acceptable contracts, no such leap outside party autonomy would be
necessary.45 As the writer knows no more about the intentions or
expectations of "duressers," killers and their payors than he knows
of serial killers, the writer shall keep silent on that except to object
to claims that contract law must presume an identity in the
" Only the social practice permits the distinction between employment
contracts for the military and murder contracts.
" Cf ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967). "Instead, as
it becomes more apparent that no clear line divides the sane from the insane, that
'we' and 'they' are more alike than we had suspected, the question of identifying
those who are not to be held responsible has nagged all the more." Id. at 4.
4' Still, one might argue, persuasively perhaps, to incorporate extrinsic
criteria into contract law on other grounds. Again, the claims here challenge only
the logic that contract law must transcend party autonomy.
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intentions or expectations of normal, sociopathic or psychopathic
behavior.
VI. SOCIAL PRACTICE: UNCONSCIONABILITY AND DURESS
Perhaps the foregoing use of social practice by liberal will
theory is itself an adoption of a party-extrinsic idea of social
practices. In this, perhaps, some may see a surrender of party
autonomy to the reasonable person engaged in a particular social
practice. Thus, extrinsic contract law criteria enter contract law
even on this account. Testing the intentions or expectations of
parties to allegedly duressed contracts by social practice is merely
a use of an objective or extrinsic criterion in contract law. Hence,
contract law must use party-extrinsic criteria. Yet, these points
merely reiterate liberalism's failure to provide oxymoronic legal
autonomy and do not make any case at all against party autonomy.
Undeniably, the doctrine of unconscionability, for example, may be
understood to be an addition of non-party values to the law of
contracts." As it is often stated, unconscionability permits the
46 Even noted will theorist Charles Fried surprisingly professes the extra-
party view of duress: "Whether it is possible to admit the defenses of duress and
unconscionability without giving away the heart of my position?" CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 93 (1981). "If a promisor knows what he is
doing, if he fully appreciates the alternatives and chooses among them, how can
it ever be correct to say that his was not a free choice?" Id at 94. "It is the
deeper, though moral criterion for coercion that we look for .... A proposal is
not coercive if it offers what the proponent has a right to offer or not as he
chooses. It is coercive if it proposes a wrong to the object of the proposal." Id
at 97 (emphasis added). "So I conclude that a promise procured by a threat to do
wrong to the promisor, a threat to violate his rights, is without moral force...
[and] such threats constitute the legal category of duress." Id at 98-99.
Fried accepts the view that eagerly giving in to a mugger is a free choice
because a victim appreciates a more dangerous alternative. Even a liberal will
theorist may thus collapse a conscious will to do an act into an intention to enter
a contract. If muggers do not think that their victims assented to a contract, why
should anyone else? If those who practice fraud, duress, or unconscionability do
not actually think that their victims assented to a contract, should anyone else?
Anyone who fully appreciates the alternatives and chooses among them is
not under duress when full appreciation means that under the relevant social
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courts to "police" the contract bargain. The language used here to
describe what courts should do under the doctrine suggests a
particular philosophy of contracts, the noted distributivist view.
Here, again, one easily misses the point of this doctrine, as with
duress: it is connected intrinsically to the social practice of
agreement rather than separate from agreement. Perhaps it is merely
easier to see the effect of the social practice on duress than on
unconscionability. Yet, the source is the same, and social practice
may be as contestable in a case of duress as it so often is in cases
of unconscionability. Economic duress nearly always poses
contestable cases of this sort. The broad historical and contempo-
rary consensus, expressions of social practice, against the use of
physical force in making contracts is somewhat looser in cases of
economic duress. So, too, is this true in determining what contracts
shock our conscience. There may be several reasons for a doctrine
that permits a court to reject contracts or parts of contracts as
unconscionable. Here, the aim is not to establish that unconscion-
ability comes from a particular philosophy, but rather to show that
a liberal theory of contract resting on socially acceptable practices
may prudently and consistently permit courts to invalidate putative
contracts involving socially understandable, but unacceptable,
practices. In doing so, courts do not need to reach beyond the
intentions of the parties as manifested in social practice. Thus, the
charge against liberalism collapses if liberalism can explain
unconscionability and related modem developments to be within
party autonomy. Indeed, a liberal will theory may accept and
explain unconscionability and other legislative "policing" of
contracts.
A. Llewellyn and Unconscionability
Karl Llewellyn's thoughts about unconscionability are well-
known and perhaps sufficiently show that a philosophy behind
unconscionability follows from the liberal value of party autonomy.
practice, the choice was voluntary. It is possible that a society might practice
voluntariness in such a way as to include mugging contracts. But that society is
unlikely to have much in the way of liberal theory or organization.
408
CONTRACT, WILL & SOCIAL PRACTICE 409
Llewellyn distinguished the dickered terms of a contract from the
undickered terms which appeared in a written document furnished
by one party. As to these latter terms, Llewellyn suggested that the
blanket assent that a party gives to these undickered terms often
extends only to those terms which are reasonable.47 In this respect,
the adoption of unconscionability, similar to much of the
U.C.C.,4" reformed legal meaning and not social practice.
Llewellyn's account of unconscionability as part of social practice
may be wrong. Perhaps people do sign contracts intending to assent
to everything in a contract document, regardless of whether they
might have agreed to the contract had they known of the terms that
they had not read. No doubt some people do so and should receive
legal treatment under the practice of blanket assent. The U.C.C.
calls for a factual hearing on claims of unconscionability to locate
the applicable social practice, whether it is "dickered" or "blanket"
assent.
People do sign putative contracts that they have not read.
Rarely, however, have they not followed Llewellyn's sketch of first
having reached agreement as to the dickered terms. The question
which form or adhesion contracts poses for contract law precedes
the idea that someone is legally obligated to perform everything in
a contract document that she signed. Classical contract law took the
very legalistic and overbroad view that one assented to everything
" What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more.
That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any
not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form,
which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
terms.
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 370-71
(1960); cf. Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
An immutable duty to read the contracts that one signs would contradict
Llewellyn's statement of unconscionability as lack of assent. An objective test
of intention forces a choice between the two views which remain controversial.
Will theory chooses neither, but would ask for evidence in contested cases on the
allegations of each party that one's expectation better corresponded to the parties'
conduct.
48 U.C.C. § 2-302 (1989).
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one signed, even in cases in which the evidence might show that
one had not read the document. Contract law took the view that
one had a "duty to read," which substituted for any evidentiary
question as to whether one had read (or understood).49 That view
may or may not have accorded with any social practice. It seems
likely that it did accord with some social practices and not with
others. The lawyered class, for example, traditionally trusted their
lawyers and granted blanket assent to what their lawyers had
approved.
But courts and lawyers take blanket assent too seriously as a
legal idea, when in fact the social practice of signing a document
is equivocal when parties sensibly or necessarily lack lawyers at
their elbow. Blanket assent thus becomes a dangerous excuse or
apology for legal obligation. Unconscionability has come to stand
for the non-legalist, social practice approach to assent. To say that
this approach imports extrinsic criteria into the decision as to
whether the parties had actually intended to be bound to the
document that was signed, begs the question that is being asked. To
say that blanket assent should be the law for anyone who signs a
contract document, is to propound a criterion that is extrinsic to
some parties' intentions if anyone behaves in the way that
Llewellyn supposed. Blanket assent would be no less extrinsic for
some parties than a rule which barred all exchanges for less than
market price.
The foregoing sketch locates the modem doctrine of uncon-
scionability well within the liberal value of party autonomy. The
idea of unequal bargaining power is not an excuse here for
importing extrinsic standards to free parties from agreements to
which they actually had agreed. Unconscionability asks important
questions about what in fact was agreed to and moves contract law
away from the sterile, formal idea of contractual assent, which
frequently had little, if anything, to do with what parties, or one of
the parties, intended.
" This must be a duty to understand.
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B. Legislation and "Policing" Contracts
The argument for viewing contracts as suitable for substantive
legal regulation stems from the perception that contract law cannot
manage problems of fairness, such as duress and unconscionability.
In this view, problems of contractual immorality require contractu-
ally external criteria. However, a liberal theory can provide reasons
why contracts should not so be conceived. By focusing on an
original contractual idea of voluntariness, a liberal theory can both
explain the presence of legislation on contracts and provide a
workable theory which manages the problems of policing not
contracts, but contract-like behavior.
Contractual legislation, for example, consumer protection
statutes, are often thought to prove the inability of contract law to
cure the problem of superior bargaining power; such statutes
supposedly set limits on freedom of contract. Yet, liberal theory
can explain contract-regulating legislation as legitimate attempts to
rectify illiberal common law doctrine. Second, the liberal thesis
may explain legislation as legitimate attempts to codify liberal
contractual doctrine. The modern doctrine of unconscionable
contracts attempts to rectify illiberal contractual doctrine which had
taken certain categorical views about what constituted assent to a
contract. Nothing in a good liberal motive assures success. Statutes,
perhaps, even more than common law decisionmaking tend to
create categorical imperatives which take on a life of their own and
all too easily threaten to overwhelm their purposes.
Legislative rectification of doctrinal error may always feed the
anti-liberal view, to some extent; yet, that is not a good reason to
withhold rectification, even if the effect appears to challenge the
liberal view. Legislation on contract law may merely suggest that
the contract doctrine developed by the courts was defective. Were
the contract doctrine incontestably the right doctrine on liberal
grounds, it would follow that liberalism's conception of contract
had proven itself unworthy. But the contract law which is called
into question by developments such as consumer protection law, as
well as seemingly uncomfortable bodies of doctrine, such as duress,
doubtfully stated liberal conceptions of contract. What is questioned
by the seeming ineptness of contract law is a conception of
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contracts developed through the common law; the connection
between that doctrine and liberalism is faint and formal.
Liberalism can tend to the concept of contract from within its
own borders, while the traditional, objective theory of contracts
must call for outside help. The legally imperialistic objective theory
of contracts was, and is, liberally fraudulent. A critical piece of that
objective theory, a legal notion of blanket assent, propagated the
illiberal idea that any seeming assent to contract was as much an
assent as any. Choice between unpleasant alternatives, whether
induced by force, is still choice. Similarly, all sound is music.
Liberalism, however, recognizes that what is music for some may
not be music for others. Similarly, liberalism acknowledges
different kinds of choice.
Unconscionability and duress may appear to palliate the
overbreadth of the moral principle that people should do what they
have promised. In this view, the moral value of doing what is
promised falls before the independent and higher value of excusing
promises that are unconscionably obtained. But, there is neither
point nor need to juxtapose promising from socially unacceptable
methods of obtaining someone's promise.
Characterization of what happens when parties are subject to
duress, as choice between unpleasant alternatives, offers a seem-
ingly neutral or objective factual description of events of duress.
This is the plain fact of the matter, about which one must agree to
continue discussion." For, the claim is that a duress victim has
chosen to contract. This choice deserves no less respect as a
contractual choice than a choice to buy or sell at the prevailing
market price. If liberal, political, or legal theory has no ground to
distinguish among choices, then perhaps only a consequentialist
analysis is available to justify perpetuation of the intuitively proper
concept of duress.5 When choice is choice, only extrinsic criteria
may respect some, but not all, choices that people make.52
0 Ronald Dworkin has criticized the "plain fact view" as a "semantic sting."
RONALD DwoRKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986).
" The traditional argument is that freedom of contract must have limits so
that it does not collapse.
52 The semantic sting is that a distributivist or consequentialist takes all
choice as factually indistinguishable. Listen to Posner's purported description of
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A liberal contract theory does not accept this plain fact view of
choice: Choice is the energizing concept of liberalism. If every
choice is a plain fact and therefore no different from every other
choice, every choice qualifies in the same way for either side of the
liberal equation.
But this plain fact view holds no better with respect to ruling
out all further conversation about choice than any plain fact view.
A liberal will contest the view that choice is choice. Some choices
are distinguishable, a liberal will say, in this respect and others in
other respects. For duress, the distinction lies in the tatters that are
left of liberty when voting or contracting at the point of a gun are
the same as free elections and contractual assent.5 3
C. Posner on Unequal Bargaining Power
Richard Posner's discussion of unequal bargaining power in
contracts displays the kind of pretentious objectivity that animates
imperialistic legal imputations-the plain fact view.54 Posner notes
that an admiralty law principle solves a popular paradigm of
duress." A ship in distress receives a rescue offer, the terms of
which would bind the ship owner to pay the salvor ninety-nine
percent of the ship and its cargo. Assuming that the ship owner or
the basis of duress:
A points a gun at B saying, 'Your money or your life' B is very eager
to accept the first branch of this offer by tendering his money. But a
court will not enforce the resulting contract. The reason is not that B
was not acting of his own free will. On the contrary, he was no doubt
extremely eager to accept A's offer. The reason is that the enforcement
of such offers would lower the net social product by channeling
resources into the making of threats and into efforts to protect against
them.
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 113 (1992). Query whether B's
"very eager" acceptance shows that B was "acting of his own free will." Id.
"' Yet, a liberal's claim to rescue liberty from the clutches of consequen-
tialism, seems no less a "plain fact view" of liberty than a consequentialist's
"plain fact view" of choice.
"' For a better view of Judge Posner, see Alliance to End Repression v. City
of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
55 Posner, supra note 52, at 116-17.
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her agent agrees to this offer, Posner points out that the admiralty
principle of a reasonable fee is all that the salvor receives.
Posner curiously describes this case: "[T]he situation is one of
bilateral monopoly, with the added complication that transaction
costs are even higher than in other bilateral monopoly contexts.
."56 This is an interesting way to describe the plight of the ship
owner who has only one rational choice, to yield to the demand or
offer and duke it out later in court. This is a real case of economic
duress according to Posner.
Yet, Posner reveals in a different example how unequal
bargaining power may have an "innocent explanation." Such
innocent explanation, however, comes from the relevant social
practice. Boilerplate language in contracts may actually not harm
consumers because overall, they might have to pay the steeper
transaction costs which might follow from the invalidity of such
adhesion contracts. Cannot innocent explanation also support the
salvor's offer for ninety-nine percent of the ship and cargo? If a
business needs to have a form contract with highly favorable terms
for itself in order to save consumers money in such transactions,
then another business may need to charge ninety-nine percent for
its rescue." If ninety-nine percent may be invalidated as too steep,
and reasonableness is used to determine the fee of the admiralty
salvor, then reasonableness may displace the terms in the adhesion
contract of consumers.
In denying whether there is fruit or even any meaning at all in
the idea of unequal bargaining power in one paragraph (which
blindly condemns all but innocent explanations of boilerplate),
Posner, in the next paragraph, on bilateral monopoly, approves
protecting the ship owner from the salvor, seemingly only because
of unequal bargaining power. His consumers who do not face
bilateral monopoly may face the same effect of inequality of
bargaining power when the market multilaterally offers the same
boilerplate. The case of ten "salvors," all of whom demand ninety-
nine percent is all too frequently the consumers' fate.
56 Posner, supra note 52, at 116-17.
" The writer here has in mind "Rescue, Inc.," whose hypothetical cost and
opportunity structure suggests a 99% average fee structure.
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Neither the consumer nor the salvor examples provide sufficient
reason to invalidate these contracts. If it is socially acceptable to
reap the benefit of ownership of an extremely scarce resource, the
bilateral monopolist or the multilateral oligopolist has not used
duress to obtain her contract. The ship owner is more like the
consumers who Posner imagines not at the moment her ship needs
rescue, but before it sails at all. At that time, the ship owner may
have other choices which are often offered to deny that consumers
lacked meaningful choice about boilerplates. Just as consumers may
resist the advertising which perhaps creates their desires for
particular products sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a ship owner
may choose to insure her ship and cargo prior to sailing. At this
moment, there is no emergency or "bilateral monopoly." If
insurance will cover either loss or cost of salvage, a ship owner
may foresee the salvor as a bilateral monopolist and decide to
insure against the event.
Missing from Posner's discussion of unequal bargaining power
is a willingness to apply the same social practice standard to the
consumers that he approved for ship owners. It is likely that behind
the admiralty reasonable fee rule lies a generally shared social
practice which overtakes the general proposition drawn from other
social practices permitting the exploitation of scarce resources.
Liberalism does not bow to such social practices as extrinsic to
party autonomy; it welcomes those explanations of the meaning of
what happened between the parties. If the salvor knows the
admiralty rule, then the salvor has no legitimate expectation that the
ship owner has assented to a contract at a higher figure. But, if
choice is simply choice, the last observation is out of bounds.
Similarly, Posner disposed of the consumers' complaint on the
allegation of a social practice of blanket assent to adhesion
contracts because they produce mutual benefits. But this supposed
social practice requires explanation as to why the benefits of
blanket assent outweigh its costs, if consumers are to accept the
blanket assent rule. Consumers do seem to accept blanket assent
under the limitation that Llewellyn supposed, that the undickered
terms are reasonable. Limiting the effectiveness of an adhesion
contract in that way seems to comport with social practice. Just as
the adhesion contract drafter would be entitled to expect enforce-
ment of the myriad of unread but reasonable provisions under that
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social practice, so too would the salvor who bargained for ninety-
nine percent of the cargo value have a claim under that social
practice for a lesser reasonable fee.
D. Fairness of a Bargain as an Extrinsic Criterion of Intent
Suppose that Rawls signed a contract of adhesion with Nozick
which contained terms that were so unfavorable to himself that a
reasonably informed person would be shocked at its unfairness.
What would it take for such a person to conclude that Rawls should
be bound to the contract? Only that Nozick convinced this person
that Rawls understood and intended the contract. Should Nozick do
so, he will have provided a better explanation for the actual fairness
of the contract than a reasonably informed person may have
perceived at first look. The fact that Rawls signed the contract of
adhesion will not itself convince anyone that her first look was
incorrect. Nozick will succeed only by tendering a better explana-
tion for why a court or a reasonably informed person should
believe that Rawls' signing the contract-like document manifested
Rawls' assent to such an apparently unfair agreement. That
explanation will relate the signed Rawls-Nozick document to the
social practice of contract.5
An open-ended mechanism for determining assent under a non-
legalist or fact-oriented will theory of contractual assent extin-
guishes policing metaphors of unconscionability or duress and their
tempting riddles about rational choice amidst compulsion. This is
not an issue of "you did assent, but the law later excuses your
obligation." Courts do not invalidate an otherwise valid contract,
although law books sometimes speak that way. Unconscionability
or duress tests the validity of the putative contract under the
relevant social practice of mutual assent.
8 Suppose the contract had Rawls selling himself into slavery to Nozick.
Could not the reasonably informed person, would not everyone, properly regard
this contract as unjust and decline its legal enforcement? That this belief is true
in our society, reflects the limits of our social practice of contract. No reasonable
person would believe either that Rawls did agree to enslave himself to Nozick
or that Nozick actually believed that Rawls so agreed.
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Thus, the conventional characterization of unconscionability as
"policing the contract" induces the perception that the doctrine
serves as a party-extrinsic criterion by which valid contracts may
be invalidated. But if a court invoking the doctrine of unconscion-
ability thought that no one would have agreed to such a bargain had
they actually understood it, one does not need to assume that
someone did understand the bargain, but should be freed from it.
One might as rationally believe that the party claiming unconscion-
ability did not understand the bargain. We can understand uncon-
scionability as an internal contract idea testing party autonomy, just
as well as we can understand it as an extrinsic idea. We can
plausibly talk about unconscionability from either point of view.
Yet, in substance, can we do so? Consider the following
argument: unconscionability imposes an external criterion to the
enforcement of bargains based on the test of whether a reasonable
person would have agreed to the contract. By testing the actual
parties' bargain against the hypothetical bargain that reasonable
people would have made, the doctrine eschews actual party intent
in favor of fictitious intent.
The aim of this argument suggests that the substance of a
bargain is not probative of the intentions or the understandings of
the parties. Although this reasoning sounds quite odd, it is quite
popular. The bargains that parties strike are at least as probative of
their actual intent to be bound as are their signatures in a writing.
Yet, the policing view of unconscionability stems from the
signature on the page, or some such formal expression of assent,
and leads directly to the conclusion that unconscionability concerns
a different issue. If unconscionability requires a criterion that is
extrinsic to the parties' intent, then so does the rule that says that
one is bound to a contract by signing it.
Consider the last point: the rule that signing a contract is a
manifestation of assent sufficient to bind the signer emerges from
the way that people show their intent to contract. It is a widespread
social practice. Yet, it excludes contract witnesses or notaries who
sign contracts; nor does the practice apply in the same way to
people who sign as sureties or guarantors. In addition, the rule does
not apply to people who signed under duress, who were defrauded
in particular ways, or to the people against whom unconscionability
was practiced.
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These events call for a review of the social practice of contracts
in any case in which they occur. Because the social practice
explains the significance of these events in its own terms, the need
or wish to look beyond the social practice for an explanation
requires some explanation itself.
A naive call for law provides one explanation for why people
want to look beyond the social practice to resolve a question of
contractual assent. Because one must usually turn to law courts to
enforce contracts, even a simple case of physical duress, like the
gun to the head example, looks like the law of duress is external to
the social practice of contracting. Courts which invalidate a contract
claim in such physical duress cases could, of course, be applying
a law of duress that is completely divorced from social practice.
Here, when a court does invalidate a contract claim for duress, it
is ambiguous whether the judicial act applies a criterion that is
independent of the social practice or a criterion that is part of the
socially unacceptable forms of behavior of the practice.
A second and stronger explanation of why courts should label
as external criteria the social practices that they use to decide
duress cases, an imperial call for law, concerns hard cases of
duress. The most contestable and controversial cases send some the
following message: The social practice is indeterminate about
whether this claim is meritorious, and so the law of contracts must
settle this matter. Here, however, is another message from such
hard cases: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the evidence you
have heard supports the claims of both parties to this case, a very
close case, to be sure .... "Adoption of a legal rule about a hard
case is possible (and all too frequently done), but unnecessary.
Were such cases necessarily resolved by a legal rule, an external
criterion would have to be used.
VII. BETTER CONTRACT LAW
Liberal theory offers an account of contract doctrines, such as
duress or unconscionability, by eschewing the separation of the idea
of agreement from such ideas as duress or unconscionability.
Liberal theory welcomes seemingly different results from seemingly
similar facts when social contexts and practices evidently justify
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what, for that reason, are substantively similar results. The claim
that liberalism cannot a priori draw the lines around fair and unfair,
duressed and unduressed and conscionable and unconscionable
agreements is true and trivial.
Distributivists make the latter claim and frequently infer the
more significant conclusion-that contract law must draw the line
on distributivist premises. Should it be unnecessary to draw the
duress or unconscionability substantive line in contract law,
liberalism's incapacity to do so would no longer be trivial. The
revised objection to liberalism thus holds that contract law needs
substantive a priori standards or rules on duress or unconscion-
ability. Whether this is a naive or imperialistic call for law to
displace or particularize principled expressions derived from social
practice, this finally raises a question of true philosophical choice
which shows, inter alia, how philosophy may affect contract law.59
Whether framed as an issue of duress or unconscionability, the
issue that such cases put to courts is whether parties reached an
agreement that courts should enforce. Moral, political, or economic
principles may all provide standards or rules by which courts may
resolve the question. These same ideas fund the social practices by
which parties frame their own views on whether an agreement has
been reached which courts should enforce.
The call for law presumes that from among these principles and
practices, some have special appeal for a law of contracts. Alterna-
tively, a law of contracts requires certainty or predictability, which
in turn requires generalization of the particular insights or benefits
of principle or practice. A liberal will theory alone denies each of
these claims. It would be redundant to continue to address this first
claim directly. The second claim remarkably restates the most
common ground that is offered in support of contract doctrine.60
'9 Cf Richard Crasswell, Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy
of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
60 E.g., Empro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir.
1989). Even highly regarded commercial judges have provided evidence of
contract law's aesthetic of legal uniformity over party intention:
Empro says the parties intended to be bound, a factual issue. Empro
treats "intent to be bound" as a matter of the parties' states of mind,
but if intent were wholly subjective there would be no parol evidence
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A substantive line-drawing contract law provides certainty and
predictability which, above all, some might claim as the principal
test of contract law.
Liberalism could challenge this thesis of certainty and predict-
ability either positively or negatively. Liberalism could claim that
its contractual proceduralism creates a more certain and predictive
law of contract. Liberalism, however, may not make such a claim
without betraying the first principle of liberty under which contract-
making should be certain and predictable or flexible and unpredict-
able-a question for particular parties and not the law of contracts.
What liberalism may offer here is the supposition that the parties
are situated better than the legislature or the American Law
Institute to obtain the certainty or flexibility that they wish.
Liberalism could challenge, on the negative side, the idea itself
that contract law of whatever foundation can provide certainty and
predictability of the particular sort that thesis has in mind.
Traditionally, contract law doctrine has taken justification in
certainty and predictability. From the early days of the mailbox
rule6 1 to current contemplation of the battle of the forms, 62
rule, no contract case could be decided without a jury trial, and no one
could know the effect of a commercial transaction until years after the
document were inked. That would be a blow to business. Contract law
gives effect to the parties' wishes, but they must express these openly.
Put differently, "intent" in contract law is objective rather than.
subjective-a point Interway makes by holding that as a matter of law
parties who make their pact "subject to" a later definitive agreement
have manifested an (objective) intent not to be bound, which under the
parol evidence rule becomes the definitive intent even if one party later
says that the true intent was different.
Id. at 425.
6 Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818), has received the
traditional legalist justification of "better a rule than no rule at all." It is possible
that the merchants in the case understood a social practice about a delayed
communication of an assent; even that the court was right for the wrong reason.
A liberal will theory seeks such evidence.
6 Examples of contract thinking which aim at perpetuating rules of contract
law abound. Among the most notorious innovations in contract law is U.C.C.
§ 2-207, about which there seems to be far more commentaries than reported
cases. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the
Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982).
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Most of the commentary would reform or abolish the section. Baird and
Weisberg have suggested that the openness of § 2-207 came by design of the
drafters. In overthrowing the mirror image rule, they suggest that the drafters
replaced that rule with the broad standards of § 2-207. But, Baird and Weisberg
contest the drafters' favoring broad legal standards: "[T]he formalist principles
of offer and acceptance underlying the mirror-image rule are fundamentally
sound." Id. at 1223. Their first reason is that the problem of the welsher may be
handled by the mirror-image rule, contrary to the conventional supposition.
Second, they suggest that the terms that the parties would receive under a mirror-
image rule may produce a better result than "off-the-rack" terms that the code
would supply where the parties have performed under § 2-207(3). A mirror-
image rule would permit parties
to avoid the off-the-rack rules that the Code supplies in the absence of
express agreement; such ready-made terms may be poorly suited to the
transaction and consequently advance the interest of neither party.
Compared with 2-207, the mirror-image rule encourages parties to
adapt the terms in their forms to the needs and abilities of buyers and
sellers in their particular market.
Id.
How might a rule of contract law be sound? Baird and Weisberg concede
that a clear showing of the parties' intent should govern. Because the problem
in the battle of the forms is that party intent is not clearly shown, they reject
factually oriented intent inquiries, as § 2-207 was in their view intended, which
would be necessarily imprecise. Id. at 1219 n.4. Further, Baird and Weisberg
assert,
In battles of the forms, one has no way of knowing if the parties have
in fact intended to enter into a binding contract regardless of any
asymmetry in particular terms. It is not only difficult to gather the
facts needed to determine whether the parties intended to contract; it
is impossible, because by the very nature of battles of forms the parties
never reflected whether they were legally bound despite differences in
terms. Indeed, the premise of a battle of the forms is that the parties
are not aware that the terms conflict until a dispute arises, and the
dispute may not arise until well after performance.
Id. at 1239-40. But reflecting whether they were legally bound is neither the
traditional test of objective contract law nor the only evidence a will theory of
intent (that is what Baird and Weisberg indorse) needs to accept on the issue of
mutual assent. As these commentators recognize, cases under the battle of the
forms in which mutual performance had not begun are rare. The major question
in battles of forms is not whether parties consider themselves bound to a
contract. The question is to what exactly are they bound. Indeed, Baird and
Weisberg contribute to the ongoing § 2-207 debate by pointing out the real
question that a liberal will theory sees: whether the incorporation of the U.C.C.
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doctrine has favored the idea that parties have a right to know
where they stand. Any number of programs of contract law can
answer that question. For example, some authorities take the
doctrinally unorthodox view that promises should only or largely
be enforced because of actual or likely reliance by a promisee.63
Perhaps, though, some parties mutually believe, either idiosyn-
cratically or pursuant to a social practice, that their executory
contracts should be enforced. Such parties may nevertheless fall
into dispute about their particular executory contract and ask a
court to resolve the dispute. If a court adopted the rule that purely
executory contracts are invalid, the rule would tell the parties where
they stand. Yet, neither this nor any particular law of contracts
would regularly or predictably tell these parties what they intended
for their executory contract.
Contract law can thus tell people where they stand, but that
may be a legal position that neither party sought. Contract law may
be predictable in this way. It may tell a party what the judge will
do. 64 Such a contract law, as for example Professor Atiyah 65
contemplates, would not honor a social practice under which
executory contracts are understood as valid. Contract law would not
be predictable for such parties.
Should one ask how the social practice might best follow the
law in this party-predictive way, one may conclude that the law
should follow the social practice. Party-predictability should flow
from the social practice just as judicial or legal predictability, as
appropriate, should flow from the courts. Were there only one
underlying social practice of contracting, contract law would be
supplementary terms, and especially a merchantability warranty, is conducted
under a test in accord with what Professor Murray aptly labels, the bargain-in-
fact. John E. Murray, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another
Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. Pir. L. REv. 597, 601-02
(1978).
63 E.g., PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 716-79 (1979); Patrick S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law
of Obligations, 94 L.Q. REV. 193 (1978).
' The writer puts this rather softly, wishing for the sake of the predictability
argument to concede that law may to some extent permit prediction of what
judges will do.
6 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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uncontroversial and uninteresting, whether contract follows social
practice or social practice follows contract law. Where social
practices are controversial, as they currently are, only a liberal will
theory provides party-centered certainty and predictability.66
CONCLUSION
Lawyers and judges often feel a need to settle a matter, even of
contract law. It is never clear that to do so they must reach outside
the practice of contract. Nevertheless, it is sadly true that lawyers
and judges often go outside contract law. Under the guise of will
theory, lawyers and judges gave us such foolishness as the mailbox
rule; under the guise of an objective theory, lawyers and judges
made us believe that parties were bound by what they signed; and
under the spell of the distributivists, we believe that liberalism's
contract often needs paternalistic medicine. Lawyers and judges
may instead treat parties having contractual disagreements with
patience, listening to their versions of the social practice and
resisting both naive and imperial calls for law.
This Article has sketched a liberal contract theory which rests
on party autonomy and needs no external values. Under a liberal
will theory, a contract between two devout distributivists deserves
different treatment than a contract between two devout libertarians.
In the course of applying will theory to each of these two contracts,
distributive considerations may be included in the case of the
distributivists, but distributivist considerations should be unpersua-
sive in the case of the libertarians. The more problematic case of
a contract between a libertarian and a distributivist will renew calls
for law to settle all such disputes, which are soundly ignored. In
66 Richard Epstein soundly points out that many business deals are fine-tuned
and custom-made written agreements Which courts should honor. Richard
Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1989). But, honoring even these super-contracts depends
on respect for contracts generally. Courts which routinely lack confidence that
their contract law will produce just results in enforcing what is on the paper, will
inevitably entertain doubts even about the documents that Epstein has in mind.
The same autonomy which animates this view of written contracts, implicates
judicial respect for other forms of evidence about the parties' intent.
423
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
short, will theory treats divergent intentions, or conflicting social
practices, as conventional contract law fact-sensitively treats
mistake in the formation of contracts.67 The more mistaken party
is bound to the intention of the less mistaken party. When parties
have different intentions, contract law follows the intention of the
party lacking knowledge or reason to know the other party's
different intention. Where each knew or had reason to know of the
divergent intentions, no contract results. But, liberal will theory
does not propound this result, as does the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, but serves as a guide to interpreting the will of these
parties. Perhaps will theory would bind the libertarian to the
distributivist's intention on evidence that the libertarian was an
extreme libertarian who accepted responsibility even for lesser
mistakes in the face of a more mistaken distributivist (who knew
or had reason to know of the libertarian's intent, but the latter
knew naught of her own).
Between two extreme libertarians, super risk-takers, people who
expect no legal paternalism, a claim of unconscionability or duress,
for example, should ordinarily encounter deaf judicial ears. On the
other hand, distributivist analysis and rectification for surprising
post-contract events are part and parcel of the legitimate expecta-
tions of distributivist contract parties. Liberal will theory may use
every contract doctrine or contract social practice. It favors none.
Any other view is imperial and potentially exploitative. Contract
law does not need to wound anyone, as it may animate the
legitimate expectations of even distributivists. But that, of course,
was the point of liberalism.
Difficult questions about what parties to contracts intended and
have assented to, strongly resemble difficult questions about what
the law is. Jurisprudence about the latter encounters difficulty
explaining the meaningfulness of calling law what judges end up
doing in controversial cases. If judges might have gone either way
in controversial cases, then they create law after the fact of the
decision and no meaningful rights precede the decision. Among
others, Ronald Dworkin has long labored against this view of
67 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981).
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controversial or hard cases in an effort to explain how rights
precede even the decision of the hardest cases.6"
In the humbler context of contracts, the same problem arises.
If the case might go either way, how parties might have any rights
before the case comes to decision is perplexing. This Article puts
special concern on what meaningful notion of assent or consent, the
idea of agreement, can exist in the law of contracts. When do
parties agree? How do they agree? The probity of imposing any
such rules under a naive or imperial idea of legal intent derives
from nonliberal values. Under liberalism, social practice sufficiently
explains contractual intent as belonging to the will of the parties,
not the law.
68 E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DwORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1976).
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